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Abstract 
Unconditional basic income for all citizens, or a public-sector job guarantee (JG), are usually 
discussed as alternative policies, though the first does not provide the benefits of an earned income 
and a good job to the ‘precariat’ and un- and under-employed, while the second fails to assist 
unpaid home carers and self-employed. Furthermore, a JG alone cannot support those who are 
unable or unwilling to work. We argue here that the only cost-effective policy for comprehensive 
welfare is a combination of a modest basic income with job offer by local authorities at less than 
the minimum wage.  
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Introduction 
Current and pending problems in most labour markets, such as persistent under-employment, more 
precarious and non-standard employment, stagnating real wages for the majority, and a perceived, 
growing threat from automation have revived discussion of the old idea of a universal basic 
income (BI) – an unconditional payment to all citizens as a basic right – with the first nation-wide 
pilot study now underway in Finland, following successful trials in developing countries. The 
fundamental rationale is to provide a minimum standard of living and freedom for all citizens, 
regardless of their ability and willingness to work. BI may reduce labour supply by some low –
wage workers, due to the income effect when recipients have other priorities such as child care, 
but this would increase social welfare and put upward pressure on (low) wages. For many with 
low incomes, even a modest BI would provide an alternative safety net to various uncoordinated, 
current forms of targeted social assistance such as job-seeker’s allowance or social credit, which 
inevitably generate a poverty trap as benefits are withdrawn with increasing earnings.  
However, replacing all welfare programmes with BI, as suggested by Murray (2013) would 
impose immense hardship on some of the poorest. Most proposals would combine BI with some 
other welfare measures, but neglect the additional benefit of a job guarantee (JG). In the UK 
combining disability and housing benefits with a modest BI would bring major welfare gains but 
fail to alleviate the additional misery of persistent, involuntary non-and-under employment. The 
much less discussed alternative of (local) government as employer of last resort, providing a JG 
for all, could thus be an important complement to BI. However, a JG would also require minimum 
standards of attendance and performance, so we shall refer to a job offer (JO) by local authorities, 
or other organisations with public funding, open to all who are able and willing to meet such 
standards.  
The combination with a JO seems to be the only policy which might realise, at relatively low cost, 
the goals of decent employment for those who seek work,  and an end to poverty for all in 
3 
 
developed economies facing a future of increasingly precarious labour markets and even secular 
stagnation.  
Proponents of either BI or JG have usually criticised the alternative policy, and neglected 
limitations of their own preferred policy (including the need for sanctions to ensure performance 
in a job ‘guarantee’). Frank (2014) proposed to combine a BI ‘that is far too small to lift an urban 
family from poverty with an open offer to pay sub-minimum wages to those willing to perform 
useful tasks in the public sphere’, because a BI above the poverty level would be politically 
infeasible, even when beneficial to a majority. However, the benefits of combining a modest BI 
and JG have been neglected by subsequent writers. Here we develop a detailed, general case for 
the complementarity of these two very different welfare policies, further explain the problems 
with either on its own, and offer illustrative numerical examples mainly for the UK, and a few 
comparisons with Germany.   
1. The future of employment and the failure of targeted welfare 
As automation threatens to accelerate the ‘hollowing out’ of middle classes and demise of even 
non-routine white-collar jobs, non-standard employment or alternative work arrangements 
combining low pay with irregular, contingent or on-call work and lack of job security have already 
proliferated everywhere to create a new ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2014; Temin, 2017). At the same 
time, forms of under-employment have persisted at much higher levels than official 
unemployment in most economies, including involuntary self-employment with low and irregular 
earnings, and part time work, for those unable to find adequate full-time jobs. The OECD (2017a) 
estimates an average labour underutilisation rate of 15 % of the workforce for 2015, including 
officially unemployed and discouraged workers no longer searching for jobs. The full-time 
equivalent (FTE) UK employment rate average is only 60% of the labour force, nearly 10 
percentage points below the average for the most successful Nordic economies. The latter in turn 
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have much lower average working hours per worker than the UK and US as well as among the 
highest life satisfaction scores (Bruenig, 2017).  
In comparison with the OECD average, the FTE employment rate in Britain (GBR) is slightly 
higher, long term unemployment is slightly lower, and headline unemployment is about half, but 
this conceals major problems in the labour market. Research by the New Economics Foundation 
(Wheatley, 2017) shows that only about 60% of workers hold ‘good jobs, which are defined as 
permanent jobs, or voluntarily temporary, or self-employed earning the Living Wage’ (£8.45 
outside London). In other words about 40% are in ‘bad jobs’ with inadequate earnings. Moreover 
‘two thirds of Britain’s children in poverty are in working families’. More than half the self-
employed earn less than the living wage, while the rise of self-employment and ‘zero hours’ 
contracts, many of which fail to provide adequate hours, helped to lower unemployment.  
Including those in the work-force who are inactive but would like to work, the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (2017) estimates an underemployment rate of 18% in the UK. The JRF and an IPPR 
(2017) Interim Report recommend many sensible policies to reduce poverty and improve 
employment and welfare, but with no mention of either BI or JO or their combination, which, as 
we show below, is a cost-effective and essential complement to standard policies. This would also 
give workers the bargaining power and resources to demand better jobs. 
A recent report estimates 6.8 million unpaid carers in the UK economy, whose work were valued 
at £132 billion, almost as much as the NHS budget (Valuing Carers, 2015). It will rise rapidly as 
the population ages and the incidence of chronic conditions such as type-2 diabetes and obesity 
increases. Home care by local authorities has been cut as part of the Conservative Government’s 
austerity policy, forcing families to provide more unpaid care themselves, averaging over 1,000 
hours p.a.  
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Meanwhile growth has mainly benefitted the rich, in particular the top 1% in the UK and US.  
Concern over rising inequality and the failure of ‘trickle down’ economics have fuelled populist 
movements in many countries (Lastra-Anadon and Muniz, 2017). Labour’s share of GDP has been 
declining in most industrial economies, while real wages of lower-skilled workers have remained 
flat or declined. Average real wages in the UK have been declining since 2007, the longest such 
decline for more than a century (Cooper and Whyte, 2017; Wren-Lewis, 2017). The expected 
impact of Brexit has likely also helped to end the ‘jobs boom’, with falling employment by the 
end of 2017. On the other hand, in the near future there will probably be an increasing shortage of 
low paid service workers in the UK due to Brexit, and the gap may not be easily filled by private 
sectors without local governments’ support. 
Traditional targeted welfare has become increasingly ineffective, with rising rates of child and in-
work poverty, as well as long-term un– and under– employment particularly in the UK and US. 
Increasingly popular in-work benefits for low earners do not help the jobless, including those who 
have dropped out of the labour market. At the same time, effective marginal tax rates for low and 
part time earners can be 70-90%, as welfare payments are tapered or withdrawn, a widespread 
‘poverty trap’ (IFS, 2010; Cooper and Whyte, 2017). 
In Germany, disposable income for the lowest 10% of incomes declined by 8% from 1991 to 2014. 
The bottom 40% experienced essentially no growth, while the top 10% benefitted from 25% real 
income growth (DIW, 2017). In the US, median full time male earnings have declined since 1972, 
while the income share of the top 1% has more than doubled to around 20%, an extreme 
concentration last observed in the 1920s. Wealth inequality is even more extreme, exacerbated by 
tax havens (Shaxson, 2011; Zucman, 2015), and by growing levels of personal debt of the poor. 
Thus the poorest half of the German population owned only 1% of total wealth in 2012, compared 
to 4% in 1993 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). The debilitating effects of growing inequality on 
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almost all indicators of social welfare have been documented by Dorling (2017) and Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2010).   
2. The return of basic income 
In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the old idea of a universal basic income has 
recently become the focus of intense interest and discussion. The related ‘negative income tax’ to 
ensure a minimum income for all had been suggested by Milton Friedman and James Tobin from 
opposite ends of the political spectrum in the US during 1970s.  Similar ideas were espoused 
earlier in Britain but were then largely forgotten until rising poverty after the financial crash of 
2008/9.   
However, so far only Finland has introduced a nation-wide pilot BI scheme in 2017, with more 
planned in Canada, Spain and the Netherlands. The OECD’s new ‘Policy Brief on the Future of 
Work’ provides a detailed survey of ‘Basic Income as a Policy Option: Can it Work?’ (May, 
2017b) covering all OECD countries. Painter and Thoung (2015), Reed and Lansley (2016), 
Standing (2017), and Torrey (2016) make compelling arguments for a modest BI of around £4,000 
p.a. in the UK, with caveats discussed below, leading Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017) to 
recognize JG as a supplementary but minor complement. 
Straubhaar (2017a, b) suggests replacing Germany’s generous € 900 billion social security budget 
and complicated tax system with a €12,000 minimum income for all citizens, and a 50% or 40% 
flat tax on all incomes and value added. However, several problems with this proposal are not 
addressed. The high VAT would cause substantial price rises, reducing the real value of the 
minimum nominal income. A four-person household with an BI of €48,000 and facing a 50% 
marginal tax would likely drastically reduce labour supply, inciting resentment among the 
growing single population, and making such a generous NIT unlikely to be acceptable. Adults 
living alone with disabilities will be worse off. Reliance on indirect taxes to fund public 
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expenditure would make the tax system more regressive. A more plausible reform might offer a 
BI of €6,000 p.a. at half the cost, plus a JO below the minimum wage, say €12,000 for full time 
work. It would keep singles above poverty, and allow additional targeted benefits, to ensure that 
nobody is worse off.  
In the UK, with less than half of German social spending per capita, a BI of around £4,000 p.a. 
for most adult citizens, possibly less for children and more for elderly (pensioners), could replace 
some but not all existing cash transfers. This is about the maximum unemployment benefit (job-
seeker’s allowance), but is less than half the poverty level for an adult living alone. Current cash 
transfers are spread across the first four income deciles, while the poorest decile pays a higher 
proportion of income in tax than the richest. However, due to the complexities of current tax and 
welfare systems, many in the bottom income deciles, particularly those with disabilities, lone 
parents and those receiving housing benefits, would be substantially worse off under such a BI 
which replaces all targeted benefits. Similar problems are found in other EU states (OECD, 
2017b).  
Thus, some means tested benefits need to be retained, but importantly, without downgrading many 
disabilities and reclassifying recipients as employable, which has caused great hardship. Housing 
benefit also urgently needs improvement to keep up with exorbitant rents and growing shortage 
of accommodation in SE England. This implies that monitoring of recipients will have to remain, 
so the simplicity of a ‘pure’ BI is unattainable. However, BI would replace the repressive and 
misnamed new ‘universal credit’, and abolish sanctions to punish unemployment benefit 
recipients for minor infringements (Patrick, 2017).  
Reed and Lansley (2016) and others estimate costs and benefits of such a modest BI. They suggest 
slightly higher top tax rates, and abolishing the Personal Allowance. Then BI roughly offsets the 
extra tax liability on the first £12,000 of income, so is ‘clawed back’ from higher earners, and 
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most of the gains go to those with lower incomes, while the resulting fiscal surplus could fund 
still- required,  means tested benefits (and the JO discussed below).  
One advantage of BI (usually viewed as a potential problem, even by advocates of BI) is the 
income effect, which tends to reduce labour supply, raising populist fears about ‘subsidising 
idleness’. On the other hand, mitigation of the ‘poverty trap’ caused by means tested, tapered 
benefits should encourage greater labour supply by low earners. Particularly in households with 
multiple job holders, or lone parents, with a high opportunity cost of time at work, the income 
effect will allow more leisure and parental time for children, with potentially important welfare 
gains.  
Moreover, even if BI reduces some individual labour supply, there is evidence that shorter hours 
can increase productivity. In fact, extensive studies of lottery winners show quite small reductions 
in average working time, partly due to more time between jobs and searching, so presumably 
resulting in better job-worker matches (Cesarini et al, 2016). Furthermore, BI should encourage 
self-employment and new start-ups with the possibility of further job-creation.  
Another aspect of BI which has worried some observers is that BI might allow some workers to 
accept lower wages for otherwise attractive jobs, and undermine minimum wage legislation. A 
job offer, discussed below, would put a floor under the total utility from employment, improving 
on a minimum wage, the benefits of which are often undermined by increased stress or unpaid 
overtime imposed by employers. 
While modest BI would not abolish poverty, particularly for the unemployed living alone, the 
alternative of a generous BI at, say £8,000 in the UK would require substantially higher taxes. 
Note that a single adult with an income of £8,500 was at the 10th percentile of the 2015/16 UK 
income distribution, while the median or 50th percentile income for a single individual was 
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£16,800 (DWP, 2017). Thus, doubling our suggested BI would still leave singles well below the 
standard poverty definition of 60% of median income, or £10,080 for a single adult.  
Politically, a more generous BI is unlikely to be feasible in the near future. As argued by de 
Wispelaere (2016), the popularity of BI may not be sustainable due to often incompatible motives 
of supporters from opposite ends of the political spectrum. A modest BI combined with a JO is 
more likely to be achievable than just a generous BI, partly by attenuating widespread opposition 
to ‘something for nothing’, and importantly because BI alone would fail to provide the widely–
recognised and documented, essential second component of psychological well-being for most 
people (Mitchell and Fazi, 2017), namely ‘dignity of work’. This dignity – the vital importance of 
meaningful employment for life satisfaction – is not provided by many ‘bad’ jobs, and even a 
modest BI would increase worker bargaining power and their ability to reject such jobs. However, 
but usually ignored by proponents, a modest BI would thus only ameliorate but not eliminate 
growing problems of un- and-under-employment as well as poor quality, non-standard 
employment under progressing automation and globalisation. The alternative of providing free 
Universal Basic Services (UBS) proposed by the Institute for Global Prosperity (IGP, 2017) also 
neglects these problems. Thus, we turn to the radical and, we argue, actually complementary 
policy alternative of a job offer or government as employer of last resort.  
3. A job guarantee, or a local public work offer? 
Government employment for those unable to find regular work was much discussed during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, and put into practice on a limited scale in various ‘New Deal’ 
programmes in the US and in other contexts elsewhere. However, it was only mobilization for 
WW2 that finally achieved full employment and ended the Great Depression. In recent years the 
formerly popular goal of ‘full employment’ has been largely abandoned and indeed becomes 
difficult to define precisely under modern labour market conditions with the growth of non-
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standard employment. Thus the goal should be to eliminate or minimize long-term involuntary 
unemployment (including growing numbers of discouraged workers who have dropped out of the 
labour market. Shorter spells of non-employment while searching for a new job are of course 
unavoidable). 
Partly for this reason, BI has attracted far more attention than the idea of a JG, though the latter 
was proposed by a few prominent economists such as Layard (2009/10) after the financial crash 
(but without BI). Gregg (2009) reviews experience with public job creation programmes in the 
UK and US, and notes problems with the ‘lock-in’ effect which reduces job-search, and the need 
for long term training and meaningful work experience. The German ‘1 Euro Jobs’ scheme was 
supposed to help the long-term unemployed return to regular work by offering work experience 
for a limited time with pay at only 1 Euro per hour, but had no explicit training programme. This 
kind of work experience has been found to reduce subsequent job chances, but refusal to accept 
an offer may be sanctioned by reducing long-term social assistance payments known as Hartz IV 
(Groll, 2016).  
In contrast, Atkinson (2015, p.140) argues that an important component of policy should be 
government ‘offering guaranteed public employment at the minimum wage to those who seek it.’ 
He also favours a ‘participation income’, which is BI with conditionality – a requirement for 
recipients to engage in some socially useful activity. This might increase political acceptability, 
but also raises serious issues about the definition and enforcement of the threshold for ‘socially 
useful’. Painter and Thoung (2015) and Dalzell (2017) also propose adding a JG to BI.  
While public work programmes have often been successful, they are generally limited in scope 
and hence not directly comparable with a JO, a policy which, like BI, has never been implemented 
on a national scale. Tcherneva (2012) reviews the successful Argentinian Plan Jefes, a form of 
local JO in response to crisis. In the US, Harvey (2012, 1989), Mitchell and Muysken (2008) and 
11 
 
Tcherneva and Wray (2005) made early cases for JG and public work for full employment. 
Mitchell and Fazi (2017), Paul et al (2017) and Spross (2017) recently argue that a generous JG 
paying at least $23,000 p.a. and rising to about $30,000 p.a. at the hourly ‘living wage’ of $15 
(twice the federal minimum wage), would eliminate poverty and unemployment and cost only a 
small fraction of a generous BI. Paul et al (2017) suggest 14 million jobs could be created at a 
total cost of nearly $800 billion p.a., but this obviously utopian plan offers little detail on the jobs 
and has other problems (Vox, 2017).  
In particular, proponents of a JG do not address the problems of work incentives, support for those 
unwilling to work, and resulting job loss in the private sector. Spross (2017) argues that the point 
of a generous JG ‘is to wipe out low-pay private employment’, but this can only be a long-term 
goal. He notes that BI could usefully complement a JO but offers no details. The combination of 
modest BI and low-pay JO discussed below would be far less disruptive, and also facilitate self–
employment with generally greater autonomy and job – satisfaction, which would not be directly 
helped by a JO alone (Alvarez and Sinde-Cantona, 2014).    
As Keynesians have frequently pointed out, major fiscal expansion is urgently needed for several 
reasons. Public infrastructure and other investment has been neglected in most advanced 
economies, long before the financial crisis of 2008/9, and massive investment in renewable energy 
and efficiency is essential to avert catastrophic climate change, which could also help to approach 
‘full employment’ with a ‘Green new deal’, as proposed by The Green New Deal Group (2008). 
The large fiscal multiplier in economies with under-utilised resources (including under-
employment) is now recognised by the IMF, and would dramatically reduce the final cost of these 
investments (Tily, 2017). Such a programme could have generated rapid recovery from the crash, 
in contrast to ‘quantitative easing’ which mainly benefitted the rich by inflating asset prices, with 
little effect on under-employment and most wages. Additional spending on BI and a JO 
programme would also imply a fiscal stimulus, and lower ultimate cost. 
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Another policy instrument for reducing unemployment which was widely practiced in the early 
1930s in the Great Depression in the US, is work-sharing by working time regulation (LaJeunesse, 
2011). Though often disparaged by economists, work-sharing was remarkably successful in 
Germany after the financial crash in 2007/8. Though GDP fell by nearly 7%, one of the largest 
declines in the OECD, average hours of work were reduced by about 3% mainly through short 
weeks, with lost wages largely replaced by unemployment benefits, while unemployment only 
rose by 0.5%, much less than in the US (Arico and Stein, 2012). The goal of ‘full employment’ 
should thus certainly include work sharing through reduction of standard work weeks as in Nordic 
economies, part time work opportunities for all, including skilled workers, as in the Netherlands, 
and meaningful sanctions for employers who try to cut costs by demanding unpaid overtime.  
A large public sector providing employment with good conditions, flexible work time and at least 
the minimum wage would put pressure on private sector employers to match these terms, and is 
indeed essential to provide the high levels of public services, including affordable child and elderly 
care, that only the Nordics currently provide, and must be funded by higher taxes on high earners 
(Partanen, 2016). The public sector should of course provide training for all who need it, and offer 
opportunities for those with various degrees of partial disability.  
However even such a large public sector is not the same as a JO for all who seek work, since some 
workers may still be unable to find adequate jobs as automation and globalisation continue to 
undermine traditional employment, particularly in the declining middle class. Even in the early 
post-war decades when un- and under-employment were low and usually short term, some long-
term unemployment and poverty still existed.  
There would obviously be substitutability between a large Nordic–type public sector and the need 
for a JO, which is currently much greater in the UK and US with their underfunded public services, 
weak welfare provisions and long hours, low wages for most,  and under–employment for many.  
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Moreover even some Nordic economies face very high unemployment (particularly in Denmark 
and Finland and mainly due to macroeconomic policy errors), rising (though still relatively low) 
poverty rates, and very high participation tax rates for entering employment.  
An unqualified JG literally implies a right to be ‘employed’ and paid, but no reciprocal obligation 
on employees to perform tasks to any required standard, a problem which proponents have 
generally neglected. The critical but essentially favourable review by Roth (2017) does mention 
the need for sanctions. An absence of any sanctions would provide a strong incentive for shirking, 
so wage cuts for missed hours or targets, or (temporary) suspension of those unwilling to work 
effectively, would have to be in place. This is not workfare since BI is unconditional, but only a 
qualified JG, or job offer (JO) for those who are able and willing to work, would be feasible.  
A JO at a wage well below the legal minimum following Frank (2014), would greatly increase the 
bargaining power of labour even when unions remain weak, and establish an effective ‘floor’ 
under wages and working conditions for those in low-paid and precarious employment, but 
maintain an incentive to seek regular work. As shown below, combining BI and JO could replace 
ineffective minimum wage legislation. A very generous JG without sanctions as proposed by Paul 
et al (2017) and Spross (2017) could not ensure work performance, and would discredit the 
programme, destroy many marginal jobs where employers couldn’t match JG conditions, and also 
lead to substantial price rises.  
Too large a take-up of JOs might exceed the scope for useful local public employment, and lead 
to direct competition with the private sector. JOs are obviously of primary relevance for the long 
term jobless including discouraged workers no longer in the labour force, usually a small share of 
those in temporary and search unemployment between jobs, so Standing’s (2017) claim that most 
JG advocates ‘ignore the fact that market economies need some unemployment to function’ does 
not apply here. 
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While some may be critical of low wage public employment, there should be broad agreement 
that such workers need to be offered career and wage progression opportunities. Lack of training 
and progression has been a major failing of ‘direct job creation’ in Germany, ‘1 Euro Jobs’ and 
other ‘workfare’ schemes (Eichhorst, 2015). These opportunities will require careful and sensitive 
management because rewarding short-term productivity in service provision, e.g. for the most 
vulnerable and elderly, may lead to neglect of other aspects of caring activities. These include 
simply taking the time to listen to the concerns and worries of those who suffer from loneliness 
and disability. Since lack of social interaction is a major cause of ill-health and unhappiness, 
efforts to provide such interaction will also generate long term material benefits in the form of 
reduced health care costs.  
Some have worried that BI may discourage low-wage women from participating in formal job 
markets. On the other hand, there are many traditionally-but not exclusively-female occupations, 
including some in self-employment and part time or non-standard employment, with relatively 
low productivity and earnings, and little security, but which are nevertheless socially valuable and 
provide job-satisfaction. In combination with BI to compensate for low pay and insecurity, such 
occupations may offer more job-satisfaction for some (both men and women) than JOs, which can 
only offer a limited range of tasks to minimise costs and direct competition with the private sector.  
In particular, over 6 million unpaid home-careers, mostly women, would be major beneficiaries 
from BI, but difficult to employ formally with a JO (though they should certainly be supported by 
JO services). Indeed, all women who work at home (including child carers) would gain a measure 
of independence from partners and spouses with BI. Some of them should gain from a JO as well. 
Therefore, several large groups, likely to grow with the trend towards more non-standard 
employment, automation, and aging population, would benefit from a combination of BI and a 
JO.  
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4. BI+JO 
In spite of the limitations of either BI or JO on their own, the benefits of combining these two 
complementary policies are rarely mentioned– notable exceptions are Atkinson (2015), Frank 
(2014), Painter and Thoung (2015), Dalzell (2017) and Spross (2017), but these authors offer little 
discussion of the details. Only the combination, together with improved housing and disability 
benefits, could bring most workless people into employment and above the poverty level without 
major tax rises, as we show in the following UK example.  
This does not deny that major tax reform and redistribution is urgently needed on equity grounds, 
as Atkinson (2015), Diamond and Saez (2011), Stiglitz (2013) and other prominent economists 
have emphasised. In the UK, progressive taxes on capital gains and housing services are essential, 
in place of highly regressive council and other taxes, but there are advantages to separating these 
issues as far as possible and concentrating initially on the most politically feasible.  
It would clearly be difficult for one country in the EU to introduce such a BI plus JO scheme 
without attracting large inflows from other member states, so eligibility restrictions to native 
citizens and long-term residents would be required for local pilot schemes, which in turn would 
be needed to attain broad political support, before nation-wide implementation.  
BI pioneers Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017, p.48) admit that guaranteed employment and 
training might ‘operate as modest complements’ to BI, which they convincingly argue is essential 
to avoid the coercive workfare implications of a JG as the sole safety net for the unemployed. By 
contrast, Standing (2017) only considers the workfare implications of a JG on its own, and neglects 
complementarity with BI. 
Chadi and Hetschko (2017) show that satisfaction with income from benefits such as 
unemployment insurance is much lower than satisfaction from earned income, even when 
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controlling for income magnitude, confirming the well-known stigma of involuntary 
unemployment, which is only partially compensated by more free time. A modest BI in place of 
some targeted benefits would improve welfare, but is unlikely to remove the stigma of 
unemployment and cannot ensure that the satisfaction of regular employment is denied to no-one. 
A few people might indeed rely on a modest BI to choose casual, untaxed work or housework, 
instead of taking up a JO.  However，the existence of JOs does provide a form of insurance 
against the failing attraction or feasibility of alternative life styles. 
A JO with training and career progression would have many more advantages for the long term 
workless, which are usually ignored by BI advocates. Precisely because BI is unconditional, an 
additional JO does not have any workfare implications, though it does offer less freedom to some 
than a generous BI, as in Straubhaar’s (2017 a, b) proposal discussed above. Most BI proponents 
do realise that this can only be a long-term goal, politically infeasible in the foreseeable future, so 
some targeted housing and incapacity benefits are still needed, though they could be partially 
replaced by a JO.  
We consider a simple example for the UK. The National Living Wage (NLW) which replaces the 
minimum wage, will be about £9 per hour in 2020, and is assumed to provide ‘full time’ pre-tax 
earnings of £16,000. This implies 1,778 hours, annual ‘full time’, say 47 weeks of 37.8 hours, 
higher than the official ‘full time’ average, classified as over 30 hours a week. To simplify we 
only consider annual earnings henceforth. We assume pre-tax BI of £6,000 p.a., (with more for 
pensioners to match current state pensions, and possibly less for children), and a basic tax rate of 
33.3% (just above 32% for existing NIC and 20% basic rate income tax, chosen to simplify 
numbers) on all income, including BI, up to the threshold for the next higher rate (currently 
£45,000 for the 40% rate), so dropping the Personal Allowance. Some higher earners would thus 
be pushed into higher rate bands, including those currently earning between £41,000 and £45,000.  
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Then the NLW worker with BI has net income of £14,652, and BI is essentially ‘clawed back’ 
from higher earners, while lower earners will be better off and no longer face the very high 
effective marginal tax rates of the ‘poverty trap’. Assume full time pre-tax JO earnings of £12,000. 
Combining BI with the JO, and 33.3% basic tax, leaves total net income of £12,000 p.a. for a full 
time single adult JO worker, well above the poverty level of £10,080 for a single adult, especially 
when combined with housing benefits. But this is also well below the NLW worker’s £14,652, 
and so maintains an incentive to seek regular work. 
 For a brief look at budget implications, total cash transfers in the UK for 2014/15 were £258 
billion. With £108 billion for pension unchanged, and additional revenue of £80 – 90 billion from 
abolishing the personal income tax allowance, this leaves £230 – 240 billion. A net BI of £3,000 
for 9 million children under 12, and £4,000 for the remaining 44 million non-pensioners add up 
to £203 billion, leaving a surplus of nearly £40 billion, to finance JOs and remaining necessary 
social benefits such as incapacity and housing.  Of course, the current crisis in the NHS, with 
substantially lower – and declining – real per capita funding compared to many EU countries, as 
well as decades of neglected infrastructure investment, all imply an urgent need for substantially 
greater public spending. In contrast to widespread misunderstandings, this does not initially 
require higher tax rates, because a money-financed fiscal expansion will generate higher growth 
and greater tax revenue as long as there are underutilised resources in the economy, with little risk 
of additional inflation. 
Net BI at £4,000 p.a. is roughly equivalent to the maximum job seeker’s allowance, so means 
tested housing and disability benefits would still be needed. A household with two unemployed 
adults and two young children would still be below the poverty line of £21,000 for this class of 
household with only £14,000 net basic income, but above poverty after adding £8,000 net JO 
earnings for one adult, and perhaps additional housing benefits (DWP, 2017).  
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Under the current system with 20% tax rate on income over £11,500, and employee NIC (national 
insurance contribution) at 12% of income over £8,000 p.a., our full time NLW worker is left with 
£14,140, which is less than the £14,652 obtained above with BI+JO. Someone earning £8,000 
with no tax or NIC currently, would in our model with BI and 33.3% tax on all income gain £1,324 
in disposable net income, and someone earning £6,000 currently would gain £2,000. Some such 
workers may also benefit from choosing (slightly) shorter hours with more time for family and 
leisure, and thus enjoy additional well-being.  
Note that a moderate increase in the JO from £8,000 to, say, £10,000 net for full time work would 
provide £14,000 with BI, almost the same as £14,140 with the NLW under current taxation. Thus 
BI+JO could replace minimum wage and NLW legislation by providing a similar income and 
utility floor under the package of pay, hours and working conditions that regular employers could 
offer, assuming (obviously essential) good JO working conditions, something that a minimum 
wage or a modest BI alone could not achieve. Since regular employment offers a much wider 
choice of occupations than JOs, it would remain the preferred choice for most even if wages were 
lower in some cases but total utility matched or exceeded that of BI+JO.  
Our proposed 33.3% tax on all income below the higher rate threshold, combined with the BI, 
might induce some marginal workers, particularly those below current tax thresholds to work less 
or remain at home and thus provide better care for dependent children or elderly relatives. This 
would probably increase  welfare, and also work  opportunities for the otherwise under- or un-
employed, since aggregate demand should be maintained by the BI, or even augmented, as the 
redistribution raises incomes of those with a higher propensity to spend on consumption. A lower 
basic tax could be funded by higher taxes on the wealthy, including a land value tax and capital 
gains tax, again perhaps a long-term goal. 
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As mentioned earlier, all this is unlikely to reduce total employment significantly due to the 
substitution effect. The biggest unknown in this proposal is the resulting number of JO employees, 
which depends crucially on the magnitude and success of other employment and fiscal policies 
such as a ‘green new deal’. There is also possible substitutability for JO workers to contribute to 
‘green’ or infrastructure investment under the proper supervision, in a form of apprenticeship.   
The long term unemployed, about 30% of all unemployed in the UK, are obvious candidates for 
full time JOs, as are discouraged workers no longer looking for work, while many under-employed 
could benefit from part time JOs. No doubt some will choose casual or housework or even idleness 
with BI, rather than a JO, raising uncertainty about final uptake. For example, 1.5 million full time 
equivalent JO workers (likely to be spread among many more part timers) would initially cost £12 
billion in net wages, plus administrative and other costs. However, this extra expenditure would 
be offset by lower benefit payments, and generate higher incomes and tax receipts by the 
Keynesian multiplier effect, so little or no extra taxation would be required. Since they would 
mainly supply personal services, capital costs would be low. Provision of urgently needed services 
will alleviate widespread misery, and saves long term health care costs as fewer patients will need 
treatment and hospitalisation.  
Our example of 1.5 million FTEs compares with just over 1 million FTEs currently employed in 
UK social services. These services are so overstretched that already over a million people are not 
getting help needed to remain in their own homes. Their care home accommodation would cost 
around £45 billion, but is not available as the number of care homes is declining, due to 
underfunding! In the meantime, overcrowded hospitals have to retain patients without home care 
(Collinson, 2016).  
Doubling current social services personnel might be a reasonable medium-term goal in the face 
of growing demand. Helping the elderly to remain in their own homes so long as possible and 
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reducing the need for costly home care accommodation would yield substantial financial returns 
as well as welfare gains. Supporting the many unpaid and overburdened home-carers would be 
another important task for expanded services with additional JO workers.  
Many job seekers (especially women) who have raised children but have little formal qualification 
for regular employment, would be well suited for these caring tasks that multiply with aging 
populations, including help with housework, shopping, transportation and many other tasks which 
do not require qualified nursing skills. Expanding urgently needed nursery and day care at low 
cost to help working parents would be desirable. However, some without formal qualifications or 
skills could also supply many important services for the growing number of elderly and infirm, 
including transport, simple gardening, and dog walking, which are far beyond the capacity of 
currently overstretched social services. The low JO wage would encourage labour–capital 
substitution, countering the prevailing tendency. Many of the service generate direct benefits to 
private households and could be charged with low fees. Then JO workers are actually paid jointly 
by the government and private customers. This will lower the total cost of JO and also create a 
potential long-term partnership between the public and local councils.  
Unskilled job seekers could also work on repairing and maintaining roads, parks, public buildings, 
conservation areas and other local public goods, with appropriate organisation and supervision, 
and help to meet seasonal demand in agriculture, tourism and other areas. Frank (2014) suggests 
also “removing graffiti from public places; painting government buildings; recycling newspapers 
and aluminium and glass containers”. There is an urgent need for more energy efficient homes, 
and insulation and upgrading of older houses, so the construction sector should expand 
employment, including apprentice/helper positions, learning on-the-job under supervision, with 
the incentive of progression to higher pay and more skilled work. Some of these tasks are currently 
undertaken by EU migrant workers, so alternatives will be required after Brexit. The government 
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support will be needed for necessary training, as well as extra financial rewards to make such jobs 
sufficiently attractive to natives. 
Comprehensive training would be an important part of JO schemes, best implemented by local 
authorities, but with funding from central government to redistribute income from wealthy to 
poorer areas with high under-employment. It would obviously be necessary to integrate and 
coordinate JO systems with local social and other services. This would facilitate promotion of the 
most proficient JO workers to higher pay grades in the regular services, while maintaining 
continuity of care and other personal relations without disruptive job changes. Thus in contrast to 
previous public job creation schemes (Eichhorst, 2015; Gregg, 1998), success of our proposal 
should not be measured in terms of transitions into private sector employment, but rather by 
quality of services provided, and by progression to higher skill and pay levels within the same 
area of public service provision. 
Local job and community centres could be developed to coordinate JOs and match supply with 
demand. It will be important to prioritise useful JO activity and avoid ‘make work’ tasks which 
would bring the programme into disrepute. Local ‘bottlenecks’ may arise for various reasons, such 
as inadequate funding for all JO applicants, and then JO rationing may be required, with means-
tested priority for the poorest households. On the other hand, demand for JO services may exceed 
supply in some areas, so JO worker mobility may be required, as well as priorities for those with 
the most urgent care needs. Local pilot of BI + JO schemes are surely needed to develop new 
organisational and managerial skills and experience for local authorities in these uncharted areas, 
and gain public acceptance.  
5. Conclusions 
A BI could replace some but not all existing cash transfers, and provide much needed support for 
the growing numbers in non-standard employment, and unpaid home carers, without the coercive 
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sanctions which often accompany targeted or conditional welfare benefits. A little noticed benefit 
of BI is that it should encourage work sharing by (slightly) reducing desired working time for 
many employees. On the other hand, only a JO with appropriate training can provide employment 
in satisfactory jobs for all who are willing and able to work, which is a major component of life 
satisfaction. Thus, even with fiscal expansion in place of austerity, a combination of these two 
measures remains the most effective policy to end long-term unemployment, the insecurity of 
non-standard employment and the injustice of unpaid or failing home care, fragile safety nets and 
frequent sanctions.  
These ideas may seem utopian today, but fundamental change requires well-designed, clear 
aspirations, however remote from current practice they may seem. The combination of successful, 
small scale trials and the many growing strains discussed above – aging, automation, globalisation, 
inequality, non-standard and under-employment – may yet generate radical change and avert 
social breakdown.   
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